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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume XVII WINTER 1968 Number 2
BAIL UNDER THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE
JOHN S. BOYLE*
BAIL PROCEDURES
HE CIRCUIT Court of Cook County, one of twenty-one Circuit
Court complexes in the State of Illinois, is the largest trial court
in the nation. Serving over half of the State's population, the
Circuit Court of Cook County has replaced 161 courts which served
the metropolitan area prior to January 1, 1964.'
The bail system in Cook County is a by-product of a streamlined
court system and an advanced bail concept. Numbering among the
accomplishments of this unique bail system is a ten percent bail provi-
sion,' a liberal use of release upon recognizance,3 a reliance upon
punitive rather than pecuniary measures to deter bail jumping' and
a twenty-four hour bond court.
The eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
* JUDGE BOYLE is Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. He re-
ceived his LL.B. from DePaul University and is a member of the Illinois Bar. He has
served as Assistant Corporate Counsel, States's Attorney, Master in Chancery, Judge of
the Superior Court of Cook County and Chief Justice of the Criminal Court of Cook
County. Judge Boyle was awarded the first Lincoln Academy Award in the Field of Law
as well as the Catholic Women's Club of Illinois VIP Citation in Juris Prudence.
1 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 8. Article VI consisting of sections 1-21 and a schedule com-
posed of paragraphs 1-13 was adopted by the electors at the general election on November
6, 1962, to become effective January 1, 1964, as an amendment to the original article
VI, consisting of sections 1-33, incorporated in the Constitution of 1870.
2 LLL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (1965).
SILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1965).
41LL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-10 (1965).
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provides that "excessive bail shall not be required" and section 7 of
article II of the Illinois Constitution requires that "All persons shall
be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses where the
proof is evident or the presumption great . . . ." In addition to the
fundamental principles underlying the granting of bail, the Illinois
General Assembly has provided that "All persons shall be bailable
before conviction, except when death is a possible punishment for the
offenses charged and the proof is evident or the presumption great that
the person is guilty of the offense." 5
Supported by a firm constitutional basis, the administration of bail
in Illinois proceeds by utilizing three basic provisions of the Illinois
Code of Criminal Procedure: section 110-2 which allows release on
recognizance,6 section 110-7 which grants release upon the posting
of ten percent of the amount of the bail by the person for whom bail
has been set 7 and section 110-8 which allows a security deposit of
cash, stocks and bonds or real estate to be posted as bail in lieu of the
ten percent deposit provided for by section 110-7. s
Since the setting of bail is an inherently judicial function, a judicial
officer must set the amount of bail for the particular offense in all
cases. The magistrate or judge setting bail is guided by the provisions
of section 110-5 in determining the amount of bail.
The amount of bail shall be: (1) Sufficient to assure compliance with the conditions
set forth in the bail bond; 9 (2) Not oppressive; (3) Commensurate with the nature
of the offense charged; (4) Considerate of the past criminal acts and conduct of the
defendant and (5) Considerate of the financial ability of the accused.'o
When bail has been set by a judicial officer, any sheriff or peace officer
may take bail, release the offender and deposit such bail with the
clerk of the court." All felony bonds must be set individually by a
judicial officer. Specified misdemeanor, quasi-criminal offense, traffic
and conservation case bonds may be prescribed uniformly by rule of
court.'2 This allows the accused to post bond with the arresting agency
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-4 (1965).
6 ILt. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1965).
7ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (1965).
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-8 (1965).
9 Conditions of the bail bond are set out by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-10 (1963).
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-5 (1965).
11
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-9 (1965).
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-15 (1967).
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and obtain immediate release when a judge or magistrate is not avail-
able and when bail is deposited in accordance with the amount pre-
setby rule.' 3 Individual determination of the bond amount may thus
appear to be side-stepped. However, the accused still retains the right
to have his bail reviewed by a judge or magistrate if he so prefers.' 4
The ten percent cash with a minimum $25 deposit, the full cash de-
posit and the security property deposits are still available to the
accused for all offenses aforementioned.
Under recent legislative enactment, chapter 38, section 110-15 was
amended. The amendment provides that the Illinois Supreme Court
may, by rule or order, prescribe a uniform schedule of amounts of
bail in specified traffic and conservation cases, quasi-criminal offenses
and misdemeanors whereby the ten percent provisions of section
110-7 shall not apply to bail amounts established for alleged violations
punishable by fine alone, and that in specified traffic cases a valid
Illinois driver's license must be deposited if the accused wishes to
avail himself of the ten percent bail provisions. 15
Provision has been made in Cook County to grant physical release
upon bail to any accused within two or three hours of arrest. Often it
is accomplished within minutes. Cook County's 954 square miles have
been apportioned for purposes of judicial administration into six
municipal districts. District number one, services 3Y2 million inhabi-
tants of Chicago and covers an area of 227 square miles. Districts two
through six service a proportionate share of the remainder of suburban
Cook County's two million people dispersed throughout its 120 cities,
villages and towns.
Bail may be posted or accepted in accordance with the uniform
court schedule for the specified misdemeanors, quasi-criminal offenses,
traffic and conservation cases in any police station, sheriff's office or
jail, or other county, municipal or other building housing governmental
units, or a division headquarters building of the Illinois Highway
Police within districts one through six.'6 The accused may then be
released immediately. When an offender is charged with a felony or
either cannot or does not post bond in accordance with the uniform
13 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16, § 81 (1967).
14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16, § 83 (1965).
1 5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-15 (1967).
16 General Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 8, January 2, 1964.
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schedule, he must appear before a judicial officer in order to obtain
release. In Cook County a judge is available twenty-four hours a day,
within the vicinity of the occurrence of the offense specifically for the
purpose of setting bail.
The Court has established a twenty-four hour bond court in the
City of Chicago, Municipal District One. The city is divided into
twenty-one police districts. Each district is electronically linked with
central headquarters which houses bond court. During court hours
from nine to five, applications for bail for persons arrested must be
made to the judge presiding in a court where the case is assigned.
If the case has not yet at that time been assigned, application must be
made to bond court. Bond court functions 365 days per year and
twenty-four hours per day. All persons who have not been released by
rule of court who are in custody and who are formally charged
(booked) must appear in court. Upon arrest the arresting agency trans-
ports the accused to appear personally before Bond Court. The judge
who will set bail has the police arrest report, the complaint and the
previous criminal record of the accused available for immediate con-
sideration. The judge makes inquiry as to the various residences and
durations, marital status, family, employment, social, church and club
affiliations and state of health of the accused. Notwithstanding the fact
that the accused may have been informed of his rights at the time of
arrest or that he will again be so informed at his preliminary hearing
the accused is advised as to: (1) the nature of his charge; (2) his
right to remain silent and the fact that any statement he may make
may be used against him; (3) his right to counsel; (4) his right to
communicate with his attorney and family in any reasonable manner;
(5) his right to be released on bail after executing the proper bond and
agreeing to comply with the conditions of the bail bond 17 and (6) the
penalties for violation of the bond. Guided by chapter 38, section 110-5
the judge then sets bail. The accused is then advised that if he cannot
make bail because it is too high he can petition to reduce it or if he is
indigent he can petition that he be released on his own recognizance.
Further review of the bail set can be accomplished in the preliminary
17 The conditions of the bail bond are expressed in chapter 38, section 110-10. "If a
person is admitted to bail before conviction the conditions of the bail bond shall be
that he will: (1) Appear to answer the charge in the court having jurisdiction on a day
certain and thereafter as ordered by the court until discharged or final order of the
court; (2) Submit himself to the orders and process of the court; and (3) Not depart
this State without leave."
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hearing which is heard at nine o'clock on the morning following the
arrest of the accused. Bail may be increased or reduced by the court
before which the proceeding is pending based upon further personal
interrogation of the defendant, argument of counsel and testimony of
witnesses. If the defendant is unable to make bail he is transmitted to
the County Jail or House of Correction to await trial. As soon as it is
determined by court records that the defendant is being held pending
trial for failure to post bond, an assistant Public Defender interviews
him to determine his suitability for a release upon individual recogni-
zance."8 The assistant inquires into the charge, the defendant's police
and employment record, his length of residence in the community,
his family ties and general background. The information obtained is
then verified. A recommendation for release of the defendant on his
own recognizance is then presented to the court which may grant the
recognizance bond. Released defendants are given a card, verifying
the time, date and place of their next required appearance. All de-
fendants who are not released on bond are set on an accelerated trial
schedule, trial usually being set within a week of the preliminary hear-
ing. At any time after failure to post bond, upon application by the
defendant, the court before which the proceeding is pending may re-
duce the amount of bail or alter the conditions of the bail bond.1" All
that is necessary on the part of the defendant is that reasonable notice
of the application to reduce bail be given to the State's Attorney,
which is in most cases waived by the State's Attorney, especially
where the defendant is not represented by an attorney.
[I]t is obvious that excessive pre-trial confinement of defendants in criminal cases
most frequently is not the fault of the judiciary or the prosecuting authorities.
Counsel for defendants, whether privately retained, court-appointed or in a Public
Defender's office, must take the initiative in presenting motions for reduction of
bail or in proper cases in urging the entry of r.o.r. orders. 20
ELIMINATION OF BONDSMEN
Given a new Bail Article, the Circuit Court of Cook County im-
mediately proceeded with its administrative and judicial authority21
l8 From February 1, 1967 to October 1, 1967 the Public Defender's Office interviewed
1,486 defendants who had not been able to make bail. Pursuant to these interviews 777
were released on their own recognizance.
19ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-6 (1965).
20 Kamin, Bail Administration in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 674, 683 (1965).
21 ILL. CONST. art. VI § 8.
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to ferret out what constituted some very grave defects in the pre-1965
bail system. The major difficulties in the bail process centered around
the professional bail bond business. More specifically the problems of
the unlawful activities of certain professional bail bondsmen and
collection of forfeited bonds required immediate solution.
"By common consent a major evil in our American administration
of justice . . . is the professional bondsman."22 The abuses of the
professional bail bond business have been notorious." In Cook County,
however, the problem was resolved. There is no record of a bondsman
having posted a full cash bond since September of 1965. In Cook
County the professional bail bondsman no longer holds the keys to the
jail in his pockets.
The reason for the abrupt disappearance of the bail bondsman has
been due primarily to the success of the ten percent bail deposit pro-
vision. 4 The operation of this provision proceeds upon a simple theory:
the accused is given the right to be released upon depositing with the
court clerk, in cash, ten percent of the amount set as his bail. Ninety
percent of that deposit is refunded when the accused returns for
trial and the case is adjudicated or disposed of by a final order. The
total net cost of the bond is therefore ten percent of the deposit
or one percent of its face amount as compared with up to ten percent
of its face amount charged by a bail bondsman.25 The accused, in the
alternative, is also allowed to deposit the full amount of bail in cash,
stocks or bonds, or double the amount of bail in real estate if he so
prefers.26 By posting the full amount of bail, he is able to avoid pay-
ment of the one percent bail cost. In 1965 the Illinois General As-
sembly made the provisions of section 110-7 and section 110-8 the
exclusive methods of "giving, taking or enforcement of bail. '27 This
enactment signaled the end of the criminal bail bond business.
2 2 BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGo 39 (1927).
23 Some of the more common abuses were overcharges of bail fees, taking security
pledges and failing to return them to the owner and collecting money reimbursements for
forfeited bond judgments which were later vacated. See also FREED & WALD, BAIL IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1964 34 (1964).
24 Section 110-7 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure served as a model for
section 3146(a) of the United States Code as amended in 1966. (18 U.S.C.A. § 3146).
25 The statutory maximum that can be charged by a bail bondsman is ten percent of
the face amount of the bond and the statutory minimum is ten dollars. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 16, § 62(d) (1965).
2 6 ILL. RE V. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-8 (1965).
27
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-15 (1965).
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Under the old Bail Bond Act, bondsmen could procure the release
of their customers simply by signing a power of attorney on their
bonds."8 At this time there are only two means of depositing bail,
neither of which fulfills the purpose of the professional bondsman.
Bail bondsmen are expressly precluded from depositing ten percent
in cash for their clients by the language of section 110-7. "The person
for whom bail has been set shall execute the bail and deposit with the
clerk of the court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of
money equal to 10% of the bail. . ,,.0 Clerks have been in-
structed that no surety or professional bondsman may make the de-
posit upon or execute a ten percent bail bond. They have been further
instructed that all refunds, checks, and receipts be endorsed, made
payable and delivered directly to the defendant only. Bondsmen do
not find it profitable to deposit with the clerk of the court an amount
equal to the required bail as ordained by section 110-8. To come to
the clerk of the court with a one hundred percent cash or securities
deposit or a pledge of real estate worth double the amount of the bond
would entail an uneconomical placement of assets for any bondsman
or surety company.
The constitutionality of sections 110-7 and 110-8 operating as the
exclusive methods of depositing bail was upheld by the Illinois Supreme
Court in People ex rel. Gendron v. Ingram.8" In that case the petitioner,
Gendron, was indicted in the Circuit Court of Peoria County in Janu-
ary of 1966 for the crime of burglary and his bail was fixed at five
thousand dollars. Gendron did not have five hundred dollars to post
as ten percent of the amount of bail as required by section 110-7 nor
did he have any stocks and bonds or real estate to deposit as security
under section 110-8. He was, however, able to obtain the signature
of a surety. No cash, stocks, and bonds or real estate were deposited
with the clerk of the court as security and the surety bond was re-
fused. The surety company was licensed under the Bail Bond Act 8
and had on deposit with the Director of Insurance securities in the
amount of fifteen thousand dollars and capital stock and surplus in
excess of one million dollars. It was argued that the surety company
was a sufficient surety within the meaning of section 7 of article II
28 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 16, § 51 (1961).
29 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7(a) (1965).
3034 Il. 2d 623, 217 N.E.2d 803 (1966).
31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16, §§ 51-65 (1965).
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of the Illinois Constitution and that it need not deposit security for
the full amount of the bail. It was further argued that section 110-15
was discriminatory against those persons charged with a crime who
could not provide the ten percent deposit but could furnish a surety.
In denying both of the above contentions the court founded its
opinion upon the purpose of bail. The purpose of article II, section
7 "is to give the accused liberty until he is proved guilty, but yet have
some assurance that he will appear for trial.13 2 "Sufficient sureties,"
the court went on to say, "means sufficient to accomplish the purpose
of bail, not just the ability to pay in the event of a 'skip.' " "Experi-
ence shows that the method of allowing a person to make bond with
a professional surety does not accomplish the purpose of bail. ' 3  It is
very apparent that the legislative intention to "severely restrict the
activities of professional bail bondsmen and to reduce the cost of
liberty to arrested persons awaiting trial"34 has been approved by the
Illinois Supreme Court.
The ten percent bail deposit has completely replaced the bond writ-
ing activities of the professional bail bondsman. Statistics for the
Municipal Court of Chicago, now Municipal District One, show that
in 1962, 51,161 professional bail bonds were written. Data for 1966
shows that no professional bonds were written and 68,355 ten percent
bonds were posted. Total collections by the Municipal Court of Chi-
cago on Scire Facias judgmehts and costs for bond forfeitures
amounted to $183,938 in 1962. In 1966, $339,881 was accumulated
due solely to the one percent amount retained by the clerk as costs
under section 110-7(f)85 and an additional $312,130 was satisfied from
ten percent deposits on forfeited bonds.
Professional bondsmen and surety company representatives pre-
dicted at the advent of the ten percent deposit system that forfeitures
under the proposed plan would be as high as ninety percent since no
defendant would bother to appear if he had no professional bondsman
to fear.3 In the Municipal Court of Chicago in 1962, 51,161 profes-
32 People ex. rel. Gendron v. Ingram, 34 Ill. 2d 623, 625, 217 N.E.2d 803, 805 (1966).
Ss1d. at 626, 217 N.E.2d at 805-06.
34 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 Committee Comments at p. 145 (S.H. 1965).
35 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7(f) (1965).
86 Bowman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 LAW FORUM
35, 38. "Bondsmen and sheriffs in Illinois object to the 10% cash deposit system on the
ground that it will cost $500 to bring back someone who deposited only $300 to begin
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sional bail bonds were written and 5,487 forfeited, a forfeiture rate
of ten percent. Figures for Municipal District One show that in 1964,
27,956 ten percent bonds were written and 2,154 forfeited, a seven
percent forfeiture rate. In 1965, 46,418 ten percent bonds were written
and 4,910 forfeited, a ten percent forfeiture rate and in 1966, 68,355
ten percent bonds were written and 8,106 forfeited for an eleven per-
cent rate. Also in 1966, 990 ten percent bonds were written in the
criminal court and 72 forfeited for a seven percent forfeiture rate.
The bondsmen's ominous predictions have failed to crystallize into
fact. Little change, if any, can be seen between the forfeiture rate
under the professional bail bond system and the forfeiture rate under
the present ten percent bond deposit system. More revenue has accrued
to the court as a by-product of the ten percent provision than was
collected by deliberate effort prior to the 1965 system. The success
of the ten percent bail deposit plan is undeniable.
COLLECTION OF FORFEITED BONDS
It has been stated that in the three year period from 1956 to 1959,
the Municipal Court of Chicago recorded only one forfeiture payment
of $5,955.7 A 1960 investigation disclosed that $300,000 in forfeitures
had been set aside. Their reinstatement caused five bonding companies
to go out of business.8 It was reported to the Joint Committee on the
Revision of the Illinois Criminal Code that from December, 1960 to
April 17, 1962, $133,366 was collected on Scire Facias judgments in
the Municipal Court of Chicago.89
With a view towards a more efficient regulation of the surety bond
business and with a further regard for uniform administration of bail
in Cook County, the Office of the Chief Judge under its administrative
authority to provide for specialized divisions established the Surety
Section. 0 Functioning as an arm of the Office of the Chief Judge, the
Surety Section is granted specific authority to collect and enforce
with. Some predict that Illinois new cash deposit statute will cause forfeitures to in-
crease four to five times over their present rate." FREED & WALD, BAIL 3N THE UNITED
STATES: 1964 31 n. (1964).
87 FREED & WALD, supra note 36, at 30.
88 FREED & WALD, supra note 36, at 30.
39 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 Committee Comments at p. 148 (S.H. 1965).
4 0 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 8; ILL. S. CT. R. 21(b); General Order of the Circuit Court
of Cook County No. 1.1 (Revised) March 1 and 7, 1966.
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liabilities arising from surety obligations. Staffed by a full time Magis-
trate, it is empowered to authorize, revoke authorization of and
generally supervise sureties and their agents. Magistrate Louis J.
Giliberto, Supervising Magistrate of the Surety Section, heard over
18,000 cases and collected in excess of one million dollars on outstand-
ing professional bond forfeitures in the year 1966 alone, and in the
year 1965 he heard 17,932 cases and collected $660,715. It is the con-
tinuing responsibility of the Surety Section to administer the twenty-
four hour bail court and to insure orderly compliance with the bail
article.
A glance at the compiled statistics at the bottom of this page points
out that the most frequently posted bond is the full cash bond. The
reason for this is that most offenses charged are minor misdemeanors,
BOND FORFEITURES
MUNICIPAL DISTRICT NO. 1
CASH 10 PERCENT RECOGNIZANCE
BONDS BONDS BONDS
1964
BONDS FORFEITED
criminal 318 1,429 67
traffic 1,222 725 379
total 1,540 2,154 446
BONDS POSTED 100,504 27,956 6,465
FORFEITURE RATE lh% 71% 7%
1965
BONDS FORFEITED
criminal 298 2,483 740
traffic 2,454 2,427 822
total 2,752 4,910 1,562
BONDS POSTED 107,166 46,418 10,002
FORFEITURE RATE 2% 10% 15%
1966
BONDS FORFEITED
criminal 419 3,637 1,276
traffic 6,861 4,469 1,048
total 7,280 8,106 2,324
BONDS POSTED 111,227 68,355 11,237
FORFEITURE RATE 6% 11% 20b%
CRIMINAL COURT
1966
BONDS FORFEITED 0 72 40
BONDS POSTED 0 990 295
FORFEITURE RATE 7% 13h%
quasi-criminal and traffic offenses for which the bond is usually set
at twenty-five dollars by court rule. It can be stated with a reasonable
degree of certainty however, that where the total bond exceeds twenty-
five dollars the ten percent cash deposit is used.4' Crimes for which
the ten percent bond is most often used are felonies, major misde-
meanors and major traffic offenses such as driving while intoxicated or
leaving the scene of an accident.
Forfeiture rates for cash bonds are relatively low. Ten percent bond
forfeitures do not significantly exceed that of their predecessor, the
professional surety bond, while it is to be noted that the volume of
use of the ten percent bonds exceeds that of the professional bond.4"
It is within the spirit of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure
to rely upon criminal sanctions rather than financial loss to assure the
appearance of the accused. Release upon individual recognizance has
been given liberal use in Cook County since the beginning of the
unified court system in 1964. There has been an almost one hundred
percent increase of recognizance bonds written between 1964- and
1966. In 1964, 6,465 recognizance bonds were posted, in 1965, 10,002,
and in 1966, 11,237. From the viewpoint of forfeitures, 446 indi-
viduals failed to appear in 1964, a seven percent forfeiture rate, 1,562
individuals failed to appear in 1965 a fifteen percent forfeiture rate and
2,324 individuals failed to appear in 1966 for a 20 percent forfeiture
rate.
The statistics on forfeitures of individual recognizance bonds en-
courage review.
4 1 An individual will at times post a full cash bond to avoid payment of the one
percent net cost retained when the ten percent bond is refunded.
42 In 1962, 51,161 professional bail bonds were written and 10 percent forfeited. In
1966, 68,355 ten percent bonds were written and eleven percent forfeited.
4 3 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1965).
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